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PROOF OF OBJECTIVE FALSEHOOD:  LIABILITY UNDER THE 
FALSE CLAIMS ACT FOR HOSPICE PROVIDERS  
Sebastian West 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Hospice care can offer important end-of-life services for individuals 
suffering from terminal illnesses, such as palliative care and the 
opportunity to spend one’s final days in the company of loved ones.1 
Hospice care enables individuals to reflect on their lives and helps them 
transition to the next chapter. Medicare coverage for hospice care is 
available to individuals certified as terminally ill.2 To certify patients as 
terminally ill, Congress requires physicians to exercise their clinical 
judgment based on clinical information and supporting medical 
documentation.3 When individuals are falsely or fraudulently certified, 
private citizens can file claims under the False Claims Act to recoup 
payment for services fraudulently billed to Medicare.4 Nevertheless, 
courts struggle to create a standard for determining whether a certification 
is false or fraudulent. 
This Note discusses the requisite legal standard individuals must satisfy 
when claiming hospice providers violated the False Claims Act. Although 
the Eleventh and Third Circuits have addressed this issue, they applied 
different standards. This Note argues that the Eleventh Circuit’s approach 
is the appropriate standard regarding the burden of production required at 
the summary judgment stage in these lawsuits.  
Section II of this Note discusses the Medicare Health Benefit, the False 
Claims Act, and lower court decisions that influenced the Eleventh 
Circuit’s holding in United States v. Aseracare. Section III addresses the 
circuit split and discusses how the “objective falsehood” standard has 
been interpreted to prove liability under the False Claims Act. Section IV 
argues that the standard adopted by the Eleventh Circuit is adequate but 
cautions that it fails to sufficiently guide the lower courts. Next, Section 
IV recommends that courts should analyze falsity under the Medicare 
Health Benefit’s (“MHB’s”) reasonable and necessary standard to decide 
if hospice providers falsely certified patients. Finally, Part V 
contemplates whether courts need a new legal standard to apply to false 
hospice certification suits filed under the False Claims Act.  
 
 1.  MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMMITTEE, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: REFORMING THE 
DELIVERY SYSTEM 207 (June 2008).  
 2.  Id. 
 3.  Id.  
 4.  31 U.S.C. §3730(b). 
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II. BACKGROUND 
Hospice programs provide quality, compassionate care for individuals 
facing terminal illness.5 Because individuals forego curative treatment 
when they enroll in hospice care,6 hospice provides a holistic approach to 
end-of-life care.7 Individuals seeking hospice treatment through 
Medicare, however, must satisfy regulatory requirements and be certified 
as terminally ill by a physician. Although most certifications are proper, 
the government can challenge the certification in a civil action under the 
False Claims Act (“FCA”) against hospice providers who billed 
Medicare. This Section discusses the MHB, the False Claims Act, and 
other lower court decisions laying the groundwork for the Eleventh and 
Third Circuit’s split over the appropriate legal standard to survive a 
motion for summary judgment when the government alleges the hospice 
provider violated the FCA because a physician falsely certified a patient 
as terminally ill.   
A. Medicare Hospice Benefit 
In 1983, Congress established the MHB,8 which designated the Center 
for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”) to promulgate rules and 
administer the MHB.9 Under the rules, MHB allows CMS to pay private 
hospice care providers for their services rendered.10 Understanding 
individuals’ changing needs surrounding end-of-life care, Congress 
enacted the MHB and recognized that impending death warrants a change 
from curative to palliative treatment.11 Thus, hospice care helps 
“terminally ill individuals continue life with minimal disruption to normal 
activities while remaining primarily in the home environment.”12  
To be eligible for hospice care, an individual must be certified as 
 
 5.  NATIONAL HOSPICE AND PALLIATIVE CARE ORGANIZATION, FACTS AND FIGURES 2 (2020 
ed.,August 20, 2020) [hereinafter NHPCO, Facts and Figures]. 
 6.  Medicare Program; Proposed Hospice Wage Index for Fiscal Year 2010, 74 Fed, Reg. 18912 
(Apr. 24, 2009) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. §418.22(b)(3)). 
 7.  See NHPCO, Facts and Figures, supra note 5, at 3 (providing hospice care involves 
physicians, nurses, therapists, hospice aides, spiritual and bereavement counselors, social workers, and 
the patient’s family).  
 8.  Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, §122, 96 Stat. 324, 
356-64 (1982) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 400, 405, 408, 409, 418, 420, 421, and 489).   
 9.  See 42 U.S.C. §1395f (Conditions of and limitations on payment for services) and 42 C.F.R. 
§§418.20-418.22.  
 10.  See 42 U.S.C. §1395d(d)(1).  
 11.  Medicare Program, 79 Fed. Reg. 50452, 50454 (Vol. 79, No. 163, Part III, August 22, 2014) 
(to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 405 and 418). 
 12.  Id.  
2
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 90, Iss. 1 [2021], Art. 9
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol90/iss1/9
330 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 90 
“terminally ill,”13 defined by the statute as a medical prognosis of life 
expectancy of six months or less.14 This certification must be based on a 
physician’s or medical director’s “clinical judgment of the normal course 
of the individual’s illness” and must satisfy two requirements,15 
including: (1) the “certification must specify that the individual's 
prognosis is for a life expectancy of [six] months or less if the terminal 
illness runs its normal course;”16 and (2) “[c]linical information and other 
documentation that support the medical prognosis must accompany the 
certification and must be filed in the medical record.”17 Additionally, the 
certification must include a “brief narrative explanation of the clinical 
findings that supports a life expectancy of [six] months or less as part of 
the certification and recertification forms.”18 This certification must occur 
within two days of initiating care or the physician cannot be repaid.19  
 To submit payment, MHB requires both an individual’s attending 
physician and either the medical director or physician member of the 
interdisciplinary group20 to certify in writing at the beginning of the initial 
ninety-day treatment period that, based on clinical judgments, the 
individual is terminally ill.21 Although there is no statutory limit to the 
number of periods through which a patient may be certified,22 to receive 
payment for each successive period, the physician or medical director 
must recertify “at the beginning of the [ninety- or sixty-day] period that 
the individual is terminally ill based on such clinical judgment.”23 While 
CMS acknowledges that prognostication is “not an exact science,” it 
requires the prognosis and certification to be rooted in clinical 
observations.24 CMS requires that clinical judgments “be supported by 
 
 13.  42 C.F.R. §418.20(b) (current through the September 14, 2020 issue of the Federal Register 
with the exception of the amendments appearing at 85 Fed. Reg. 56686).  
 14.  42 U.S.C. §1395x(dd)(3)(A). 
 15.  42 C.F.R. §418.22(b) (current through the September 14, 2020 issue of the Federal Register 
with the exception of the amendments appearing at 85 Fed. Reg. 56686). 
 16.  Id. §418.22(b)(1).  
 17.  Id. §418.22(b)(2). 
 18.  Id. §418.22(b)(3).  
 19.  Medicare Program; Hospice Care, 48 Fed. Reg. 56,008, Cmt. D: Certification of Terminal 
Illness, but subject to exceptions under 42 C.F.R. §418.22(a)(3).  
 20.  42 U.S.C. §1395x(dd)(2)(B) (“has an interdisciplinary group of personnel which (i) includes 
at least (I) one physician (as defined in subsection (r)(1)), (II) one registered professional nurse, and (III) 
one social worker, 
employed by or, in the case of a physician described in subclause (I), under contract with the agency or 
organization, and also includes at least one pastoral or other counselor.”).  
 21.  Id. §1395f(a)(7)(A)(i)(I)-(II); See also 42 C.F.R. §418.22(c)(1) (stating that for the first 
ninety-day treatment period, the hospice must obtain written certification from both the medical director 
and the individual’s attending physicians, if the individual has an attending physician). 
 22.  42 U.S.C. §1395d(d)(1). 
 23.  Id. §1395f(a)(7)(A)(ii).  
 24.  See supra text accompanying note 11. 
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clinical information and other documentation that provide a basis for the 
[hospice] certification.”25  
B. The False Claims Act 
Given the complex statutory requirements for MHB eligibility, 
certification requires several pairs of reviewing eyes. Noncompliance 
with certification, however, is possible. When the hospice provider falsely 
asserts compliance with the statutory and regulatory requirement for 
certification, the federal government or a private citizen, called a 
“relator,” can bring a civil action pursuant to the FCA under a “false 
certification” theory of liability.26 
The FCA allows the federal government and relators to impose civil 
liability on individuals who made false claims to the United States for 
payment of services rendered.27 The FCA provides that any person who 
“knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, a false or fraudulent claim 
for payment or approval” or “knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be 
made or used, a false record or statement material to a false or fraudulent 
claim” is liable to the United States Government for a civil penalty and 
treble damages.28 
When relators bring a qui tam action, the government can intervene.29 
Should the government fail to intervene, the relators can continue the 
action, but the court may allow the government to intervene at a later date 
for good cause.30  
Although the FCA has explicit definitions for what constitutes 
“knowingly” making a false claim or statement,31 there is no definition 
for “false.” Courts therefore look to the common law to define “false” 
claims or statements.32 However, because medical professionals conduct 
 
 25.  See supra text accompanying note 11.  
 26.  See Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S.Ct. 1989, 1999 (2016) 
(providing that when a party makes a representation for reimbursement, but omits certain statutory or 
regulatory requirements, those omissions can be a basis for False Claims Act liability).  The Attorney 
General brings the FCA action for the federal government. 31 U.S.C. §3730(a). Private citizens, called 
relators, bring a qui tam action. 31 U.S.C. §3730(b)(1). Qui tam is defined as “an action brought under a 
statute that allows a private person to sue for a penalty, part of which the government or some specified 
public institution will receive.” Qui Tam Action, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (5th pocket ed. 1996). 
 27.  31 U.S.C. §§3729-33 (2020). 
 28.  31 U.S.C. §3729(a)(1)(A)-(B) (2020).  
 29.  Id. §3730(b)(2).  
 30.  Id. §3730(c)(3). Should the government fail to intervene, the relator can continue the suit on 
the government’s behalf and is entitled to a percentage of the proceeds of the action or settlement. Id. at 
§3730(d). The FCA also protects the relator against retaliation by rewarding all relief necessary to make 
the relator whole. Id. at §3730(h)(1).  
 31.  See id. §3729(b)(1) (providing the statute’s definition of “knowingly”). 
 32.  See Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S.Ct. 1989, 1999-2000 
(2016) (holding courts have looked to common law to fill definitional gaps, and without indication 
4
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the certifications, lower courts have adopted an “objective falsity” 
standard for FCA challenges to allegedly unlawful hospice certification 
and repayment.33  
C. Lower Court Decisions 
In United States ex rel. Geschrey v. Generations Healthcare, LLC., the 
Northern District of Illinois held that to assert false claims, relators must 
allege facts that “[demonstrate] that the certifying physician did not or 
could not have believed, based on his or her clinical judgment, that the 
patient was eligible for hospice care.34 The relators alleged the hospice 
provider recruited and later certified several patients ineligible for 
certification because those certifications occurred with only a review of 
patients’ records and no physical patient interaction.35 The relators argued 
these certifications were false because had patients been examined by 
physicians, the physicians should have realized these patients were not 
terminally ill.36 Nevertheless, the court dismissed the relators’ claim,37 
reasoning that to survive a Rule 9(b) motion, certifying physicians only 
need to confirm that their basis for certification was their review of the 
record.38  
In United States v. AseraCare Inc. (“AseraCare I”), the Northern 
District of Alabama ruled that, to survive a motion for summary 
judgment, the relator must prove objective falsehood, and that a mere 
difference of opinion without more is not enough to show falsity.39 The 
government, and relators, alleged AseraCare submitted false claims to 
Medicare for certified patients who were not terminally ill as defined by 
the statute.40 The government offered a single medical expert’s testimony 
 
otherwise, Congress intends to incorporate the well-settled, common-law meanings).  
 33.  See infra note 78. 
 34.  922 F. Supp. 2d 695, 703 (N.D. Ill. 2012). 
 35.  Id. at 700. Relators allege that they would visit patients and prepare certifications to be signed 
off by the medical director, who never visited the patients him/herself and conclude their own medical 
judgment.   
 36.  Id. 
 37.  See id. at 703 (dismissing relators claims at pleading stage because 42 C.F.R. 
§418.22(b)(3)(iii) was improperly interpreted). 
 38.  Id. However, the court did let one claim proceed because relators did not merely claim a 
difference of opinion but plead with particularity the hospice provider’s misrepresentation. Id. at 704. 
 39.  153 F. Supp. 3d 1372, 1381 (N.D. Ala. 2015) (“AseraCare I”). To reach this conclusion, the 
court relied on United States ex rel. Parato v. Unadilla Health Care Ctr. Inc., 787 F. Supp. 2d 1329, 1339 
(M.D. Ga. 2011) for the “proof of objective falsehood” component and United States ex rel. Phalp v. 
Lincare Holdings, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 3d 1326, 1360 (S.D. Fla. 2015) for the “mere difference of opinion” 
component because that court held “[e]xpressions of opinion, scientific judgments, or statements as to 
conclusions about which reasonable minds may differ cannot be false.”  
 40.  AseraCare I, 153 F. Supp. at 1375.  
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to prove the certifications were false.41 That expert testified that over 100 
AseraCare patients were erroneously certified as terminally ill based on 
his clinical review of 233 records.42  
The jury instructions were crucial to the court’s ultimate decision. They 
explained that “a claim is ‘false’ if it is an assertion that is untrue when 
made or when used” and “practices that may be improper, standing alone, 
are insufficient to show falsity without proof that specific claims were in 
fact false when submitted to Medicare.”43 After a verdict for the relators,44 
the court granted a motion for a new trial and ruled that the relators needed 
to demonstrate proof of an objective falsehood, and without more, a mere 
difference of opinions regarding terminal illness status was insufficient to 
prove falsity.45 Ultimately, the court resisted an approach that would 
undermine the clinical judgment of the certifying physician.46 
In United States ex rel. Wall v. Vista Hospice Care, Inc., the Northern 
District of Texas relied on Aseracare II and applied the objective 
falsehood standard.47 The court ruled that an expert’s subjective 
 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  See id. at 1375-76 (stating the government’s expert reviewed a total of 233 patient records 
who receiving continuous care for over 365 days and determined that 123 patient certifications did not 
support a prognosis of terminal illness). 
 43.  Id. at 1382. Before the jury verdict, the court denied AseraCare’s motion for summary 
judgment urging the court to adopt the falsity standard articulated in Geshrey. The court denied the motion 
because the standard focused too much on certifying physicians’ beliefs, and the court believed the 
government should be able to link witness testimony to show physicians lacked sufficient information to 
make clinical judgments. The case was bifurcated to first determine the falsity element and then the 
remaining FCA elements: knowledge, materiality, and government forfeiture. The bifurcated trial had 
important implications for the Eleventh Circuit’s decision because at trial, the government could only rely 
on some of the record to argue the falsity element. The district court did not allow the government to 
present the entire record that was going to be used in the combined knowledge, materiality, and forfeiture 
trial.  
 44.  See AseraCare I.153 F. Supp. at 1379 (noting after the government’s case-in-chief, AseraCare 
moved for judgment as a matter of law and renewed its motion at the close of evidence; however, the 
court reserved ruling on the motions and submitted special interrogatories to the jury, who ruled in favor 
for the government on 104 of the 123 patient records).  
 45.  Id. at 1385. Additionally, the court granted summary judgment sua sponte because it 
determined that even under the correct legal standard, the government would not have been able to prove 
objective falsehood. The government only had presented testimony of an expert who reviewed old 
certifications yet failed to prove that simply because reasonable minds may differ does not mean the initial 
certification was false. Id. at 1387. Importantly, the court noted that the relator’s expert could look at the 
patient records at two different occasions and come to different conclusions about the prognoses, yet not 
be incorrect on either review, meant his “contradiction of the certifying physician’s clinical judgment 
alone cannot constitute sufficient evidence of falsity.” U.S. v. AseraCare Inc. (“AseraCare II”), 176 F. 
Supp. 3d 1282, 1285-86 (N.D. Ala. 2016) (granting new trial and summary judgment in Aseracare’s 
favor), aff’d in part and remanded in part, 938 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 2019). 
 46.  See AseraCare II, 176 F. Supp. 3d at 1285 (granting summary judgment sua sponte for 
AseraCare) The court refused to allow the government to retain an expert to present contradictory 
testimony to prove falsity because it previously ruled that expressions of opinions that reasonable minds 
can differ cannot be false.  
 47. No. 3:07-cv-00604-M, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80160, at *59-61 (N.D. Tex. June 20, 2016).  
6
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testimony regarding certification, without more and in the absence of 
objective falsehood, was insufficient to allege “falsity.”48 In this case, the 
relator attempted to satisfy the burden of proof by presenting a single 
medical expert’s testimony regarding proper certifications.49 The court 
explained that the expert’s testimony that ninety-percent of the reviewed 
records were ineligible for certification50 failed to present a triable issue 
of fact.51 Nevertheless, the court noted that had the relators linked the 
expert testimony to the corporate scheme to falsify records, there might 
have been a triable issue on the “falsity” element.52  
In Druding v. Care Alternatives, Inc., the District Court of New Jersey 
relied on AseraCare I and Vista Hospice and held that relators must 
present evidence of a claim’s objective falsehood, and that a mere 
difference of opinions without more is not enough to show falsity.53 Here, 
the relators alleged the defendant engaged in a concerted effort to recruit 
patients and then fraudulently certify them as MHB-eligible.54 The 
relators relied on examples of FCA violations as well as their expert’s 
report.55 Their expert reviewed forty-seven patient records and opined 
that twenty-six of those patients were eligible for their entire treatment 
periods, while sixteen were only eligible for part of their respective 
periods.56 Additionally, the expert opined that any reasonable physician 
 
 48. Id. at *59-61.  
 49. Id. at *31. First, relator had a statistician select 12,000 patients to be in the population, select 
a stratified sample of 291 patients for the medical expert to evaluate, and then extrapolate the expert’s 
evaluations to form an opinion of the 12,000 claims in the population that were false.  
 50.  Id. at *33-34. 
 51.  Id. at *59. The court ruled extrapolation cannot establish FCA liability because hospice 
certification is a subjective process for each patient’s eligibility, which depends on the clinical judgment 
of the certifying physician. Id. at *36. The court continued to explain that Medicare allows certifying 
physicians to use subjective medical findings. As there are no objective standards for eligibility, the 
contrary subjective opinion of the relator’s expert was insufficient to prove certifying physicians erred in 
evaluating life expectancies and whether those physicians failed to exercise their clinical judgments during 
those certifications. Id. at *58. 
 52.  See id. at *60-62 (suggesting that relators link the scheme of false certifications to expert 
testimony to prove falsity). 
 53.  346 F. Supp. 3d 669, 685 (D.N.J. 2018) ) (ruling mere difference of expert opinion on clinical 
judgments is insufficient for falsity under the FCA), rev’d, 952 F.3d 89 (3rd Cir. 2019). The court relied 
on the premise that medical opinions are subjective and cannot be false as Fifth Circuit similarly held in 
United States ex rel. Riley v. St. Luke's Episcopal Hosp., 355 F.3d 370, 376 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding 
“expressions of opinion or scientific judgments about which reasonable minds may differ cannot be 
‘false’”). Id. 
 54.  Id. at 672. After relators filed the lawsuit in April 2009, the government stayed the lawsuit for 
further investigation, and after seven years, finally informed the court that it would not intervene in the 
action. Id. at 676. 
 55.  See id. at 677-79 (discussing relators’ testimony).   
 56.  Id. at 681. Relators had the expert review the forty-seven records that were produced during 
discovery. The expert explained the difficulty in prognostication, but he relied on guidelines from experts 
at the National Hospice and Palliative Care Organization and other criteria utilized in the field to perform 
his review. At the end of his review, 214 out of 603 periods (~35%) of the hospice certification periods 
7
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would have reached the same conclusion.57 However, Care Alternatives’ 
own expert reviewed the relators’ expert’s findings and testified that, 
based on his clinical judgment and analysis, a reasonable physician would 
have certified each of the forty-seven patients.58 The court ruled that 
diverging opinions do not create a genuine issue of material fact when 
there is no factual evidence that certifying doctors knowingly made false 
determinations.59 
After the Druding opinion’s release in 2018, FCA claims for hospice 
certification followed a well-reasoned rule of law. To survive a motion 
for summary judgment, the relator must prove that the defendant engaged 
in objective falsehoods when certifying patients, and a mere difference of 
opinion among medical experts would not suffice to prove claims of 
falsity.  
III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT  
The Druding standard circulated in the lower courts until the Eleventh 
and Third Circuits considered it, which resulted in the circuit split. This 
Section examines the Eleventh Circuit’s ruling in United States v. 
AseraCare, Inc., which adopted the Druding standard. Next, this Section 
explains how the Third Circuit rejected the Druding standard in United 
States ex rel. Druding v. Druding and instead held that a difference of 
opinion among medical experts is tantamount to a genuine issue of 
material fact.60  
A. AseraCare III 
 In AseraCare III, the Eleventh Circuit adopted the “objective 
falsehood” standard but remanded the case with direction.61 In AseraCare 
III, the court reasoned the government’s case was weakened because the 
expert failed to affirmatively testify that, “in his opinion, no reasonable 
 
lacked documentation supporting hospice care. He also found that some medical records were incomplete 
for the certified patients. 
 57.  Id. Although the expert opined that any reasonable physician would have reached the same 
conclusion, the relators’ expert failed to show any falsity in the certifications.  
 58.  Id.  
 59.  Id. at 688.  
 60.  952 F.3d 89, 95 (3rd Cir. 2019) (holding differing medical expert testimony that opines patient 
certifications did not support patients’ prognoses can be considered false creates a dispute of material 
fact).   
 61.  U.S. v. AseraCare, Inc. (“AseraCare III”), 938 F.3d 1278, 1281 (11th Cir. 2019) (ruling that 
falsity under Medicare for FCA liability cannot be proved when there is only a reasonable disagreement 
between medical experts and no other evidence to prove falsity). The Eleventh Circuit remanded the case 
because the government should have been able to rely on the entire record and not merely what was argued 
during the falsity element of the bifurcated trial.  
8
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doctor could have concluded that the identified patients were terminally 
ill at the time of certification.”62 Instead of affirmatively testifying that no 
doctor would have given a prognosis of terminally ill, the expert relied 
solely on his clinical judgment and a review of patient records, which 
conflicted with those of AseraCare’s expert.63 In addition, the court 
considered how the experts reached their conclusions. The government’s 
expert used a ‘checkbox approach’ by relying on his clinical judgments 
and medical guidelines for MHB eligibility, whereas AseraCare’s expert 
took a more holistic approach to certifying patients.64 Although the 
experts agreed on the underlying diagnoses, they diverged regarding their 
conclusions for the patients’ eligibilities.65 The court reasoned that the 
experts’ conflicting testimonies and the lower court’s insufficient jury 
instruction forced the jury to decide which expert was “more persuasive, 
with the less persuasive opinion being deemed to be false.”66 
Next, the Eleventh Circuit emphasized that the term “clinical 
judgment” permeates the statutory and regulatory requirements for 
certification.67 The court therefore found that hospice certification must 
be based on the certifying physician’s clinical judgment regarding a 
holistic patient medical record.68 The court noted that the regulations do 
not require clinical judgments to prove terminal illness as a matter of 
medical fact or that patients’ records demonstrate to a reviewing and 
unaffiliated physician that the patients were terminally ill upon 
certification.69 Rather, the regulations merely state that “clinical 
information and other [supporting documentation for certification] . . . 
 
 62.  Id. at 1287. 
 63.  Id. at 1284-85, 1287. The government’s expert testified that 123 of the 233 records he 
reviewed did not satisfy hospice eligibility requirements. 
 64. See id. at 1288 (articulating the fundamental difference in how experts should analyze patients 
for eligibility).  
 65. See id. at 1289 (providing an illustration of how the experts starkly disagreed with patient 
eligibly even though they agreed on the patient’s diagnoses).  
 66.  Id. at 1288-89. As a case of first impression, the Eleventh Circuit had to resolve eligibility 
issues when the “certifying physician exercised genuine clinical judgment [to determine] a patient’s 
prognosis” and if the accuracy of that judgment was “susceptible to being proven as true or false as a 
factual matter.” See id. at 1291-92 (conceding no other circuit had considered falsity for a MHB violation 
and summarizing the issue for review).  
 67.  See id. at 1292-93 (emphasizing that 42 U.S.C. §1395f(a)(7)(A) requires that for the initial 
90-day hospice period, signatures of both the individual’s physician and the medical director each certify 
eligibility based on their clinical judgements, and that for subsequent hospice periods, recertification 
requires clinical judgment. Also, 42 C.F.R. §418.22(b) states terminal illness is determined by the 
certifying physician’s clinical judgement).  
 68.  See AseraCare III, 938 F.3d at 1293 (noting that given the requirements of 42 C.F.R. 
§418.22(b)(2)-(3) and the 79 Fed. Reg. 50452, 50471 (Aug. 22, 2014), clinical judgments lie at the center 
for certification and patient records help physicians make informed decisions regarding certification).  
 69.  See id. at 1293-94 (noting the absence of language in the statute and regulations to require that 
clinical judgments prove terminal illness as a matter of medical fact and patient records to prove to any 
reviewing expert that the patient was objectively terminally ill when she was certified by the physician).  
9
West: Proof of Objective Falsehood
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2021
2021] PROOF OF OBJECTIVE FALSEHOOD 337 
accompany the certification” and “be filed in medical record.”70 So, 
clinical judgments regarding eligibility only require a “reasonable 
interpretation of those relevant medical records.”71 The court further 
noted that because prognostication is not an exact science, Congress 
granted deference to certifying physicians to make clinical judgments 
regarding certification72 but still required physicians to rely on subjective 
and objective medical findings of patients’ conditions before arriving at 
clinical judgments.73 
Recognizing that reasonable doctors may disagree regarding a patient’s 
condition, the court ruled that two physicians exercising their clinical 
judgment of a patient’s prognosis could disagree without either of them 
being incorrect.74 As long as the underlying clinical judgment did not 
reflect objective falsehood, there could be no FCA liability.75   
The court then provided three examples that would satisfy objective 
falsehood: (1) the certifying physician held an ill-informed clinical 
judgment by failing to familiarize herself with the patient’s records before 
certification; (2) the certifying physician did not subjectively believe the 
patient was terminally ill; or (3) expert evidence proves that no reasonable 
physician could conclude that the patient was terminally ill given the 
medical records.76 In sum, if relators only present evidence of differing 
expert opinions regarding certification, without providing evidence of 
objective falsehoods, the claim fails as a matter of law and granting 
summary judgment is proper.77 
 
 70.  See id. at 1294 (quoting 42 C.F.R. §418.22(b)(2)).  
 71.  Id. at 1294. The court also noted that CMS did not use the word “objective” to demonstrate 
terminally illness in patients’ medical records; CMS only used “support[ing]”. Id.   
 72.  See id. at 1295 (according to 79 Fed. Reg. 50452, 50470, CMS knows “predicting life 
expectancy is not an exact science,” and thus well-founded clinical judgments should be granted 
deference). Later in its opinion, the court also notes that “’terminally ill’ presents, by design, a question 
of debatable clinical judgement that may not, in all circumstances, lend itself to just one determination as 
to the proper exercise of that judgment.” Id. at 1299. 
 73.  See id. at 1295 (relying on 42 C.F.R. §418.102(b), the court ruled clinical judgments cannot 
disregard patient’s underlying medical conditions; they must consider factors like “subjective and 
objective medical findings”). 
 74.  See id. at 1296 (accepting the district’s court post-verdict conclusion that physicians could 
disagree on projected life expectancy, and thus eligibility, but neither physician be wrong). Here the court 
mentions that the government’s own witness, a former head of the company who processes claims for 
MHB reimbursement, testified that “two doctors using their clinical judgment could come to different 
conclusions about a patient’s prognosis and neither be right or wrong.” Id. 
 75.  See id. at 1297 (relying on CMS commentary, the court stated the legal framework for MHB 
did not require exact certitude for prognostication but only required that certifying physicians exercise 
their best judgment for eligibility when considering all the relevant medical records).  
 76.  See id. (providing various methods to prove objective falsehood for eligibility).  
 77.  See id. at 1297 (holding that without evidence of objective falsehood, FCA claims fail as a 
matter of law). The court relied on several circuit court decisions where FCA liability could only be 
asserted by plaintiffs proving objective falsity. See e.g., United States ex rel. Yannacopoulos v. General 
Dynamics, 652 F.3d 818, 836 (7th Cir. 2011); United States ex rel. Loughren v. Unum Grp., 613 F.3d 
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AseraCare III requires that relators produce evidence of objective 
falsehood to survive a motion for summary judgment. An array of 
opposing experts does not prove false certifications because reasonable 
minds can differ on clinical judgments, and Congress has granted 
deference to certifying physicians when determining whether a patient 
has a terminal illness.    
B. United States ex rel. Druding v. Druding 
In contrast, the Third Circuit held that differing expert testimony 
creates a triable issue of material fact under the MHB.78 The court ruled 
expert testimony can establish FCA falsehood when the testimony opines 
that patient records do not support a prognosis of terminal illness.79 
Rejecting the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis, the Third Circuit held differing 
clinical judgments can prove falsity, thereby establishing FCA liability 
and the chance to survive a motion for summary judgement.80 
First, the court noted that Congress did not define the terms false or 
fraudulent under the FCA, and therefore courts have looked to the 
common law for guidance.81 The court reasoned that because other courts 
have held expert opinions can be false, the subjective nature of opinions 
in conjunction with contradictory medical expert opinions can show 
falsity under the FCA.82 Moreover, the court criticized conflating the 
scienter and falsity elements into the “objective falsity” standard to 
 
300, 310 (1st Cir. 2010); United States ex rel. Wilson v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 525 F.3d 370, 376-
77 (4th Cir. 2008); United States ex rel. Burlbaw v. Orenduff, 548 F.3d 931, 959 (10th Cir. 2008); Harrison 
v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 792 (4th Cir. 1999); Hooper v. Lockheed Martin 
Corp., 688 F.3d 1037, 1047-49 (9th Cir. 2012); Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers Dist. Council Constr. Indus. 
Pension Fund, 575 U.S. 175, 186 (2015). Aseracare III, 938 F.3d 1297 at n. 10. 
 78.  See United States ex rel. Druding v. Druding (“Druding II”), 952 F.3d 89, 91 (3rd Cir. 2019) 
(holding that plaintiffs who bring an FCA lawsuit do not need to prove objective falsehood to survive a 
motion for summary judgment because differing expert opinions regarding MHB eligibility do create a 
genuine dispute of material fact as to falsity.  
 79.  See id. at 95 (holding contradictory expert testimony regarding patient MHB eligibility can be 
considered false under the FCA and establish a triable issue of liability).  
 80.  See id. (ruling the district court erred when it relied on the N.D. Ala. and N.D. of Tex. cases 
which adopted the “objective falsehood” standard) (emphasis added).   
 81.  See id. (relying on Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S.Ct. 
1989, 1999-2000 (2016), courts have looked to common law to fill definitional gaps, and without 
indication otherwise, Congress intends to incorporate the well-settled, common-law meanings). 
 82.  The court relied on several cases where opinions are considered “false” for purposes of 
liability under common law. See e.g. Omnicare, 575 U.S. at 183-85 (2015) (finding opinions may be false 
statements in determining liability under the securities law); Hersckowitz v. Nutri/Sys., Inc., 857 F.2d 
179, 184 (3rd Cir. 2015) (finding “an opinion . . . will be deemed untrue for purposes of the federal 
securities laws if it is issued without reasonable genuine belief or if it has no basis”); See also 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§525 cmt. c, 539 cmt. a (Am. L. Inst. 1977) (“instructing that an 
opinion may be false when the speaker makes an express statement contrary to the opinion he or she 
actually holds”). See Druding II, 952 F.3d at 95-96.  
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determine FCA liability.83 The court noted that scienter limits hospice 
providers’ exposure to FCA liability when the government or relator can 
find any expert who disagrees with the certifying physician.84 Thus, 
conflating the two requirements is “inconsistent with the text and 
application of the statute.”85 
Second, the Third Circuit rejected the lower court’s ruling that falsity 
could only be established if experts’ judgments were factually incorrect—
not just legally false because of expert disagreements regarding 
certification.86 The court explained that a theory of legal falsity is 
sufficient for establishing FCA liability when claims submitted for 
reimbursement are not reimbursable because they fail to meet regulatory 
requirements.87  
Because experts could disagree on a patient’s prognosis and eligibility, 
these disagreements can be evidence that a certification is non-compliant 
with regulations and therefore legally false.88  Accordingly, different 
expert opinions create a genuine issue of material fact that is triable.89 
Moreover, because the court established that subjective medical opinions 
can be false for purposes of the FCA, and are therefore not immune to 
scrutiny, 90 the court held that differing opinions can create triable issues 
regarding FCA falsity.91  
As mentioned, the Third Circuit criticized other courts for adopting the 
“objective falsehood” standard and mistakenly conflating falsity and 
scienter when ruling on motions for summary judgment.92 The court 
 
 83.  See id., 952 F.3d at 96 (noting that the FCA denotes falsity and scienter elements 
independently for a proving liability under 31 U.S.C. §3729(a)(1)(A)).  
 84.  See id. (relying on United States ex rel. Polukoff v. St. Mark’s Hosp., 895 F.3d 730, 734 (10th 
Cir. 2018)  (noting scienter requirements can be used to address excessive liability concerns).  
 85.  Id.  
 86.  See id. at 97 (rejecting the rigid position that clinical judgments are subjective in nature, and 
thus, different opinions cannot be false).  
 87.  See id. (relying on United States ex rel. Walker v. R&F Props. Of Lake Cty., Inc., 433 F.3d 
1349, 1356 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding “[m]edicare claims may be false if they claim reimbursement for 
services or costs that either are not reimbursable or were not rendered as claimed”).  
 88.  See id. (reasoning that certification requirements under 42 C.F.R. §§418.20 and §418.22(b)(2) 
articulate strict regulatory guidelines, and the fact that experts could look at the same medical records and 
come to different clinical judgments on a patient’s prognosis meant there was evidence that hospice 
providers failed to meet regulatory guidelines for certification and thus reimbursement for treatment).  
 89.  See id. at 98 (stating expert opinions can be false at times and the reliability and believability 
of expert testimony should be left to the jury to establish a FCA liability under the legally false theory). 
The court continued to say that subjective medical opinions can be considered false and medical opinions 
are not shielded for judicial scrutiny.  
 90.  See id. at 100 (relying on United States v. Paulus, 894 F.3d 267, 276-77 (6th Cir. 2018) 
(providing that the common law definition of fraud permits that medical opinions may be considered false 
and are not shield from judicial scrutiny).   
 91.  Id.  
 92.  See id. at 100-01 (reversing the district court’s grant of summary judgment for Care 
Alternatives and specifying that Third Circuit courts must analyze “falsity” and “scienter” elements 
12
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therefore decided that differing medical expert opinions regarding 
certification should be sent to the jury to determine whether they were 
indeed false. 
IV. DISCUSSION 
Although the Eleventh Circuit’s proof of objective falsehood 
requirement was appropriate, a better way to assess expert review of 
recertifications would be to determine whether the initial certification was 
“reasonable and necessary for the . . . management of terminal illness.”93 
Part A of this Section argues that the Eleventh Circuit adopted the correct 
legal standard. Part B of this Section argues that the Third Circuit’s 
holding was misplaced because it requires more than what is written in 
the regulations. Part C of this Section argues that the Eleventh Circuit 
should have scrutinized the expert’s review of the certifications against 
the reasonable and necessary provision for treating terminally ill patients. 
Under that standard, the Eleventh Circuit could have found examples of 
objective falsehoods. Part D of this Section emphasizes the importance of 
the 2011 changes for hospice certification and suggests that if the changes 
were enacted before the relators brought suit against AseraCare, they 
could have been successful in their claim. Finally, Part E of this Section 
argues that the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis provides some immunity for 
hospice providers against future FCA liability and discusses potential 
policy and legal implications of the decision.  
A. The Eleventh Circuit Adopted the Correct Legal Standard 
The Eleventh Circuit was correct in deciding that, to survive a motion 
for summary judgment on the element of falsity, relators must prove 
objective falsehood.94 As the court noted, the FCA’s statutory language 
and regulatory framework both support an “objective falsehood” 
standard.95 Because nothing in the language or framework requires 
certifying physicians to be certain that patients would die at the end of six 
months,96 CMS gave physicians deference regarding patient 
certifications. The law only requires that physicians look to the 
accompanying clinical information and other documents in patients’ 
medical records to make certification decisions.97 Because the physicians 
 
independently when adjudicating FCA lawsuits).  
 93.  42 U.S.C. §1395y(a)(1)(C).  
 94.  See supra text accompanying note 78. 
 95.  AseraCare III, 938 F.3d at 1298. 
 96.  Id. 1296.  
 97.  See 42 C.F.R. §418.22(b)(2) requiring that clinical information and other documentation 
13
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in AseraCare III exercised their clinical judgment and relied on the 
patients’ medical records, the physicians complied with the legal 
requirements and properly certified patients.98  
Congress did not require physicians’ clinical judgments to be 
incontrovertible when making their certifications, and thus, physicians 
could not have falsified any records when they demonstrably satisfied the 
legal requirements.99 The law does not require anything more for hospice 
providers. Unless relators can present more than conflicting expert 
testimony, there are no factual issues for juries to resolve.100 Allowing the 
jury to assess differing expert opinions contradicts the wide latitude 
Congress granted physicians to exercise their clinical judgments to make 
an informed decision without fear of future liability.101 Regardless, the 
split between the Third Circuit’s and Eleventh Circuit’s interpretations of 
falsity under the FCA unnecessarily complicated FCA hospice 
jurisprudence.102 
B. Critique of Third Circuit’s Ruling 
The Third Circuit wrongly held that differing expert opinions are proof 
of a genuine issue of material fact.103 Despite the Third Circuit’s statement 
that courts must interpret statutes to determine violations, the court read 
words into the statutory text.104 To certify patients for hospice care, 
Congress only required that clinical judgments comply with regulations. 
If Congress wanted more criteria, then it is up to Congress to make those 
determinations.105 The mere difference of opinions regarding certification 
does not make the certifications false—and thus triable—because 
Congress has not written that into the statute. Furthermore, a litany of 
FCA lawsuits have previously held “[e]xpressions of opinion, scientific 
 
support the medical prognosis.  
 98.  See AseraCare III, 938 F.3d at 1296.  
 99.  Id.  
 100. See id. at 1297 (providing that failure to identify facts and circumstances surrounding patient 
certification that show inconsistencies with proper clinical judgment fail as a matter of law).  
 101.  See AseraCare III, 938 F.3d at 1295.  
 102.  Patrick M. Hagan, Two Circuits Hold the FCA Does Not Require “Objective Falsity,” 
Creating Confusion on the Appropriate Standard, 6 PRATT'S GOV’T CONTRACTING L. REP. §63.04 (2020) 
(stating the Third Circuit’s rejection of AseraCare III creates unnecessary confusion). 
 103.  Id. (arguing the Third Circuit improperly immunized that all medical opinions from liability 
and thus botched its analysis of the falsity element and confused the rule of law that is likely similar to 
the Eleventh Circuit’s holding).  
 104.  See Druding II, 952 F.3d at 95 (providing that questions of statutory interpretation begin with 
an analysis of the text) (citing Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 1999). 
 105.  See AseraCare III, 938 F.3d at 1301 (stating that Congress determines eligibility requirements 
for certification, and until Congress changes how a physician’s clinical judgment governs certification, 
that clinical judgment is granted deference when making prognoses that lead to certification).  
14
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judgments, or statements as to conclusions about which reasonable minds 
may differ cannot be false.”106 
The Third Circuit held that FCA liability can arise under the implied 
false certification theory.107 While both circuits agree that implied false 
certification leads to liability, the Third Circuit did not discuss how Care 
Alternative providers failed to follow the statutory and regulatory 
framework for certification. When the government’s expert reviewed the 
records, he opined that his prognoses would not have resulted in 
certification.108 That difference of opinion is presumably proof of a 
genuine dispute of material fact. That expert, however, could not further 
testify that Care Alternative’s certifications violated the legal 
frameworks—crucial to the legally false analysis for compliance with 
regulations.109 The government’s expert could not testify to that point 
because the patient records he reviewed included the requisite clinical 
information and supporting documentation.110 Had those records lacked 
the necessary supporting documents, then Care Alternatives would have 
violated the law, because it falsely certified patients.111 In that scenario, 
those violations would have been elicited by differing experts opining that 
 
 106.  United States ex rel. Roby v. Boeing Co., 100 F. Supp. 2d 619, 625 (S.D. Ohio 2000) 
(ultimately denying defendant’s motion for summary judgment because plaintiff’s presented evidence of 
objective falsehood that defendant supplied United States Army with defective helicopter transmission 
gears). See also United States ex rel. Riley v. St. Luke's Episcopal Hosp., 355 F.3d 370, 376 (5th Cir. 
2004) (holding “expressions of opinion or scientific judgments about which reasonable minds may differ 
cannot be ‘false’”); United States ex rel. Morton v. A Plus Benefits, Inc., 139 Fed. Appx. 980, 983-84 
(10th Cir. 2005) (granting defendant’s motion to dismiss because expression of opinions regarding an 
ambiguous term regarding insurance coverage under ERISA did not sufficiently allege FCA liability); 
United States ex rel. Hill v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry, 448 Fed. Appx. 314, 316 (3rd Cir. 2011) (affirming 
the district court’s granting of defendant’s motion for summary judgment after three independent review 
panels confirmed that there was no scientific misconduct and thus relators failed to prove objective 
falsehood); United States ex rel. Jones v. Brigham & Women's Hosp., 678 F.3d 72, 87, 90 (1st Cir. 2012) 
(agreeing that scientific judgments which reasonable minds can differ cannot be false, but vacating the 
grant of summary judgment because the facts did not amount to scientific judgments); U.S. v. Prabhu, 
442 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1036, n. 23 (D. Nev. 2019) (granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment 
because relator failed to show falsity regarding tests that were reasonable and necessary). 
 107.  See Druding II, 952 F.3d at 97 (stating the Third Circuit recognizes both factual falsity and 
legal falsity for FCA liability).  
 108.  Id. at 94.  
 109.  See id. (leaving room for this omission of the expert’s testimony, which was pivotal the Third 
Circuit’s legally false analysis).  
 110.  See id. (providing the records satisfied §418.22(b)(2) requirements).  
 111.  That did not happen in this case. Even if the district court did limit its analysis to factual 
falsity, upon appellate review, it should have been clear that the district court’s analysis was in fact limited 
to legal falsity. See Druding II, 952 F.3d at 97 (stating the district court limited its FCA falsity analysis to 
factual falsity). This was because the government argued that by having an expert find the certifications 
to be improper, Care Alternatives must not have complied with the regulations. See Druding, 346 F. Supp. 
3d at 681 (describing the government’s expert’s testimony). Nowhere did the government argue that Care 
Alternatives falsified those patient records before Care Alternative physicians certified patients. See id. at 
680-81 (providing evidence that relators alleged altered patient records so that patients could be certified 
but failing to link those allegedly altered records to those records reviewed by the government’s expert).  
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there was insufficient information in the patient record to warrant 
certification, which would have presented a triable issue.  
Furthermore, the Third Circuit inappropriately relied on Sixth Circuit 
precedent to determine that clinical judgments are not immune from 
judicial scrutiny.112 Citing United States v. Paulus, the Third Circuit 
adopted that “medical ‘opinions are not, and have never been, completely 
insulated from scrutiny,’” and that “‘reliability and believability of 
[differing] expert testimony . . . is exclusively for the jury to decide.’”113 
However, Paulus involved criminal liability for healthcare fraud.114 The 
Third Circuit also ignored the Paulus court’s reasoning “that opinions 
may trigger liability for fraud when they are not honestly held by their 
maker or when the speaker knows of facts that are fundamentally 
incompatible with his opinion.”115 Instead of limiting that language to 
allege liability, the Third Circuit used that language to support the 
position that differing medical opinions raise genuine disputes of material 
fact.116 Finally, the Third Circuit failed to note that Dr. Paulus’s 
conviction was based on his misrepresentation of facts rather than 
opinions.117  
The Third Circuit’s failure to acknowledge these considerations 
weaken their ruling for two reasons. First, the court ignored important 
language regarding the scienter element of an FCA claim. The Sixth 
Circuit arguably combined the falsity and scienter elements, which the 
Third Circuit explicitly held was improper because the elements are 
distinct.118  Second, because the Sixth Circuit reinstated the conviction 
due to misrepresentation of facts rather than a difference of opinions, the 
Third Circuit selected favorable parts of the Sixth Circuit’s holding. Had 
 
 112.  See Druding II, 952 F.3d at 98 (relying on United States v. Paulus, 894 F.3d 267 (6th Cir. 
2018)). 
 113.  See id. (quoting Paulus, 894 F.3d at 275, 277).  
 114.  See Paulus, 894 F.3d at 270 (reversing the district court’s judgment of acquittal after 
defendant Paulus was convicted of healthcare fraud).  
 115.  Id. at 275 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §539(1)(a) (Am. L. Inst. 1977).  
 116.  See Druding II, 952 F.3d at 98. See also Winter ex rel. United States v. Gardens Reg’l Hosp. 
& Med. Ctr., Inc., 953 F.3d 1108, 1118 (9th Cir. 2020) (noting false certification of medical necessity can 
give rise to FCA liability). In Winter, the court held that any patient certification for medically necessity 
can be false for the same reasons as any opinion can be false, but the FCA does not require a plaintiff to 
plead an “objective falsehood.” Id. at 1119. The “objective falsehood” standard was adopted by lower 
courts and the Eleventh Circuit because after extensive discovery, the relators needed to present more 
evidence than what was pleaded to proceed to trial.  
 117.  Druding II, 952 F.3d at 98. The court failed to provide that crucial detail in its analysis, and 
by doing so conflated that the expert testimony going to trial in Paulus was in fact expert opinion 
testimony reviewing medical records, when it was actually expert opinion testimony regarding verifiable 
facts. 
 118.  See id. at 100 (stating scienter and falsity are separate elements of an FCA claim). See also 
Hagan, supra note 103(arguing that by using Paulus and Omnicare as authority, the Third Circuit 
contradicts itself because both of those cases conflate falsity and scienter elements).  
16
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the Third Circuit reasoned that the government’s expert opinion differed 
from Care Alternative’s expert opinion because of the misrepresentation 
of facts in the patient records, then the two differing testimonies would 
present a genuine dispute of material fact.   
While the Third Circuit’s ruling appeared to be an anomaly in FCA 
claims,119 the court’s belief that medical opinions should not be entirely 
insulted from judicial scrutiny is persuasive. If we accept that medical 
opinions can never be scrutinized, maybe individuals who argue hospice 
certifications that result in unreasonable and unnecessary care for the 
management of terminal illness can be used to help prove the initial 
certifications were indeed false.120  
C. Certifications that Result in Reasonable and Necessary Care 
The Eleventh Circuit should have considered how the certifications at 
issue conformed to the reasonable and necessary regulation. To begin, the 
government’s expert reviewed 233 records, but the Eleventh Circuit failed 
to acknowledge the factual importance of those records.121 All of the 
certification records were for patients receiving hospice care for over a 
year.122 The Eleventh Circuit should have required AseraCare to justify 
those certifications because the patients twice outlived the regulatory 
expectation of terminally ill individuals.123  
While prognostication is not an exact science,124 repeated 
recertification of hospice status should raise questions. Patients in hospice 
care for over 365 continuous days require a minimum of five 
recertifications.125 That number should raise questions about the 
correctness of the initial certification, especially because the median 
length of hospice care ranged from seventeen to eighteen days from 2000 
 
 119.  See supra text accompanying note 78. But see Hagan, supra note 103 (arguing that the 
muddled Druding II ruling actually requires the same standard as AseraCare III to prove falsity—relator’s 
expert to opine that no reasonable physician could have reached the conclusion at issue).  
 120.  42 U.S.C. §1395y(a)(1)(C).  
 121.  See AseraCare III, 938 F.3d at 1284, 1304 (providing that the district court acknowledged the 
233 certifications were for patients receiving treatment for over 365 continuous days, and the Eleventh 
Circuit stating that the expert’s testimony might still not be enough to show falsity because the expert 
could not link those records to the specific instances of questionable certifications provided by each 
relator’s testimony).  
 122.  Id. at 1284. 
 123.  See 42 U.S.C. §1395x(dd)(3)(A) (“individual is considered to be ‘terminally ill’ if the 
individual has a medical prognosis that the individual’s life expectancy is 6 months or less”). 
 124.  See supra text accompanying note 11.  
 125.  See 42 U.S.C. §1395f(a)(7)(A) (stating that for the first 90-day period, a physician or medical 
director certify patient as terminally ill, and for the subsequent 90-, and each subsequent 60-day, period 
the medical professional recertify at the beginning of the treatment period that the patient is terminally ill 
based on clinical judgments). The patients were certified five times because 365 days equates to two, 90-
day periods and three, 60-day periods.  
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to 2010.126 
According to regulations, the initial certification requires a prognosis 
of terminal illness based on a medical expert’s clinical judgment and 
supporting documents.127 Yet, if the patient is on his fifth recertification, 
does that mean the first clinical judgment, made 300 days ago, was 
misguided, arbitrary, unreasonable or unnecessary?128 If true, the initial 
certification is potentially proof of an objective falsehood.129 
Furthermore, if the first certifying physician was the same physician 
recertifying the patient for the fifth time, then relators could allege that 
the physician could not hold a subjective belief the patient was terminally 
ill for the first certification.130 The argument being, that by certifying the 
patient on day 300, the physician believed that she initially certified a 
patient when no other reasonable physician would have made that same 
initial certification.131  
To recertify a patient who no other reasonable physician would have 
recertified is exactly what the Eleventh Circuit described as proof of 
objective falsehood.132 If an expert had testified to that fact, AseraCare’s 
motion for summary judgment may have been denied. Moreover, the 
ability for an expert to provide such testimony becomes more plausible 
when viewed against the total number of patients from which the sample 
was taken.  In AseraCare III, 2,180 individuals received continuous care 
for over 365 days. Only 233 patient certifications, however, were subject 
 
 126.  David G. Stevenson, Ph.D., Growing Pains for the Medicare Hospice Benefit, 367: 18 N. 
ENGL. J. MED. 1683, 1684 (Nov. 1, 2012) (the author importantly notes that this figure represents a sizable 
minority of beneficiaries who enroll only days before death). Additionally, in the government’s complaint 
filed in 2012, it was alleged that from at least 2007, AseraCare submitted false claims for Medicare 
reimbursement. See Intervenor Complaint at ¶35, United States v. AseraCare, Inc., 153 F. Supp. 3d 1372 
(N.D. Ala. 2015) (Case No. 2:12-cv-0245-KOB).  
 127.  See 42 C.F.R. §418.22(b)(2) (“Clinical information and other documentation that support the 
medical prognosis must accompany the certification and must be filed in the medical record”). 
 128.  Stevenson, supra note 127, at 1684 (stating “defining hospice eligibility relative to the 6-
month prognosis mark is clinically arbitrary and practically difficult, especially for people with noncancer 
diagnoses”).  
 129.  The objective falsehood would be that the physician did not subjectively believe the patient 
was terminally ill. 
 130.  The author writes this sentence because the subjective belief of the certifying physician that 
the patient was not terminally ill is an example of how to prove “objective falsehood” according to the 
Eleventh Circuit.  
 131.  For some MHB figures see MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMMITTEE, REPORT TO THE 
CONGRESS: MEDICARE PAYMENT POLICY, 355, at Figure 6.1 (March 2009) [hereinafter MedPAC March 
2009 report] (providing that from 2000 to 2005, the median length of hospice stay was just over two weeks 
but stays for patients in the 90th Percentile rose from approximately 140 days to approximately 215 days). 
It would appear that even on day 300, the physician would arguably be recertifying a patient who would 
fall in the 99th Percentile. See also Amanda Jacobowski, Calculating Death: Implications of the Six-
Month Prognosis Certification Requirement for the Medicare Hospice Benefit, 19 ELDER L. J. 187, 203 
(2011) (finding that in 2008, the average length of a hospice stay was 69 days). 
 132.  See supra text accompanying note 77.  
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to expert testimony.133 Although the size of the patient pool provides no 
concrete indication that any single certification was legally false, it is 
arguable that relators could have retained several experts to testify that 
hundreds of those 2,180 initial certifications were false and required 
unreasonable and unnecessary treatment.134 
If the above argument had been accepted, then the Eleventh Circuit 
would have concluded that the initial payment for hospice services during 
the first 90-day period was neither reasonable nor necessary for the 
management of terminal illness.135 This presents a clear example of legal 
falsity. Because the relators provided proof of an objective falsehood that 
patients were not terminally ill, CMS paid for services that were not 
reasonable and necessary.136 That alone warrants FCA liability because 
the person submitted “a false or fraudulent claim for payment or 
approval.”137 Had the Eleventh Circuit scrutinized these facts, it could 
have found that AseraCare violated the FCA and determined the 
government presented a triable issue. More importantly, the court could 
have provided direction for lower courts to determine additional ways 
hospice providers can legally falsify certifications and bill CMS. Instead, 
the court simply ruled that, so long as reasonable doctors exercised 
clinical judgments when making certifications, there is no falsehood.138 
The Eleventh Circuit’s ruling may have created a paradox for the 
government and relators.139 Because the government cannot solely rely 
on expert testimony to show that hospice certifications were false, there 
becomes an unenforceable legal rule.140 Consequently, the Eleventh 
Circuit essentially granted hospice providers immunity from future 
 
 133.  See AseraCare III, 938 F.3d at 1284-85 (stating the government built its case from a universe 
of approximately 2,180 patients who received hospice care for 365 days and narrowing its sample size to 
233 patients).  
 134.  The author writes hundreds because if one expert opined that he would not have certified 123 
of the 233 patients records, then a few experts could possibly opine that they would not have certified 
hundreds of the approximate 2,180 patient records.     
 135.  See 42 U.S.C. §1395y(a)(1)(C) (“no payment made be made under part A [of Medicare] . . . 
for any expenses incurred for items or services—in the case of hospice care, which are not reasonable and 
necessary for the palliation or management of terminal illness”). 
 136.  For the AseraCare lawsuit, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) sought $67.5 million for 
fraudulent claims for a total of $200 million because of the FCA’s treble damages. See Buck, infra note 
140, at 26-27.   
 137.  31 U.S.C. §3729(a)(1)(A). 
 138.  See Aseracare III, 938 F.3d at 1301(“[an] FCA claim fails as a matter of law if the plaintiff 
proves nothing more than a reasonable difference of opinion as to the patient's prognosis”).  
 139.  Isaac D. Buck, A Farewell to Falsity Shifting Standards in Medicare Fraud Enforcement, 49 
SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 41 (2018) (arguing that by dismissing medical necessity-based FCA claims due 
to a mere difference in clinical opinions between doctors, the DOJ could never prove that clinical opinions 
were not deserving of medically necessary treatment). 
 140.  Id. at 41-42. 
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lawsuits.141 By reasoning clinical opinions for certification are complex 
and not an exact science, the court’s ruling creates a high bar to prove 
those certification were false and unnecessary. Although the Eleventh 
Circuit’s holding leaves the government and relators a huge legal hurdle 
to overcome, there might be hope for future claims.  
D. The 2011 Amendments to Conditions and Limitations for Payment of 
Services 
Effective January 1, 2011, for each recertification after the patient’s 
180th day of hospice care, the certifying physician must have a “face-to-
face encounter with the individual to determine continued eligibility of 
the individual for hospice care.”142 The change in eligibility requirements 
resulted from a March 2009 report issued by the Medicare Payment 
Advisory Committee (MedPAC).143 MedPAC felt that the current MHB 
payment system incentivized providers to improperly certify patients 
because of the financial benefits of long-term hospice stays.144 Before the 
change, there was little enforcement of regulatory compliance, but with 
the 2011 changes, providers could only seek repayment for hospice 
services if they conducted a face-to-face visit and provided a brief 
narrative for the certification.145  
The 2011 addition is important because the initial AseraCare lawsuit 
arguably hinged on the reasons why MedPAC recommended changes. 
AseraCare did not require physicians to conduct face-to-face encounters 
to recertify patients; instead, physicians could make clinical judgments 
based on all the clinical information and supporting documentation. Had 
AseraCare been required to conduct these face-to-face encounters for the 
third certification period,146 AseraCare’s providers would have had to 
familiarize themselves with patients’ records and provide a brief narrative 
for why certification was still proper. With those procedures in place and 
 
 141.  See Aseracare III, 938 F.3d at 1301 (Government arguing that the legal standard would create 
an under-inclusive problem because hospice providers with sloppy or improper certification procedures 
could evade FCA liability so long as they can assert their physicians’ clinical judgments were justifiable). 
See also Buck, supra note 140 at 30 (arguing so long as hospice providers present a reasonable clinical 
disagreement about certification, they will be immunized from FCA enforcement and liability).  
 142.  42 U.S.C. §1395f(a)(7)(D)(i)(I); 42 C.F.R. §418.22(b)(3)(v).  
 143.  MedPAC March 2009 report, supra note 132, at 350, Recommendation 6-2A. 
 144.  See id. at 348-49 (providing that certification requirements and payment reform was 
imperative because current MHB lacked adequate administrative and other controls to check incentives 
for longs stays and CMS lacked data vital to the effective management of MHB. By reforming the 
certification process, MHB could have more oversight for regulatory compliance to reduce unnecessary 
CMS expenditure).  
 145.  42 C.F.R. §418.22(b).  
 146.  The face-to-face encounter would have occurred prior to the third certification period starting 
on day 181. 
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documents recorded, when providers went to recertify the patient for the 
fourth or fifth time, they still would have had to review the medical 
records and supply a brief narrative for the certification. If upon reviewing 
the record the certifying physician found that no reasonable physician 
would have initially certified the patient, relators could prove a type of 
objective falsehood described by the Eleventh Circuit.147 Furthermore, the 
failure to even record face-to-face encounters or brief narratives for 
patients in the certification process would give rise to FCA liability under 
the legally false certification theory.148 This hypothetical, however, and 
most hospice FCA actions brought before 2011, will be resolved at the 
summary judgement stage or likely be moot because of the changed 
requirements for recertification. 
E. Practical Implications 
The Eleventh Circuit’s ruling may immunize hospice providers from 
future FCA liability.  Lawsuits filed before the 2011 changes will most 
likely be resolved at the summary judgment stage because of the 
hardships relators face when attempting to prove objective falsehood.149 
So long as hospice providers can defend a reasonable disagreement about 
the clinical judgment to certify patients, the providers will not be held 
liable.150 In other words, the providers avoid liability because their 
certifications are reasonable.151 Even if opposing experts disagree and 
determine the certifications are false, making treatment unnecessary, then 
hospice providers may still prevail on a motion for summary judgment 
because the certification would be reasonable. This consequence of the 
Eleventh Circuit’s approach has significant financial implications for the 
government.  
Granting hospice providers some level of immunity impedes the 
government from collecting treble damages after a favorable verdict152 or 
future settlement amounts. For example, the government alleged $67 
million in fraudulent claims and sought a total of $200 million in damages 
 
 147.  Additionally, by reviewing the record, the physician would have to familiarize herself with 
the patient record.  
 148.  The hospice providers would be liable for their failure to comply with regulatory 
requirements. See 42 C.F.R. §418.22(b)(3)(v). 
 149.  See generally the lower court decisions in AseraCare I, U.S. ex rel. Wall v. Vista Hospice 
Care, Inc. and Druding v. Care Alternative, Inc. Also, hospice providers argued that all of their 
certifications were proper, and to avoid treble damages, they arguably spared no expense to find an expert 
to testify that no reasonable doctor would conclude that the certifications were medically improper.  
 150.   See Buck, supra note 140, at 30.   
 151.  Id. at 45 (arguing that the if the Eleventh Circuit adopts the district court’s holding, it will 
immunize providers who “administer care that is not medically necessary, but ‘reasonable’ nonetheless”). 
 152.  31 U.S.C. §3729 (a)(1).  
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from AseraCare.153 In the first trial, the jury returned a verdict for the 
government, creating upwards of $200 million in liability for 
AseraCare.154  But, the standard changed, and now the government will 
have to satisfy a more robust burden of proof to recover damages.155 That 
standard protects hospice providers from large damages and disincentives 
providers from settling, as the chances of prevailing on a motion for 
summary judgment may have increased.156   
Additionally, the AseraCare III and Druding II cases seem to rely on 
moot legal standards. The standard may be moot because there is lesser 
need for relators to prove objective falsehood now.157 If any reviewing 
physicians can see that the third or any subsequent certification was 
improper because of the supporting medical records and narrative or lack 
thereof, then there is no dispute of material fact. Instead, the hospice 
provider plainly failed to comply with the statutory and regulatory 
frameworks and is liable. Certainly, medical judgments still need to be 
immune from judicial scrutiny,158 but FCA liability for hospice 
certification weighs more heavily on regulatory compliance than actual 
medical opinion.   
In sum, the Eleventh Circuit’s adoption of the “objective falsehood” 
standard presents the clearest framework for courts to determine whether 
hospice certifications complied with regulations. However, the Eleventh 
 
 153.  See Buck, supra note 140 at 26-27.  
 154.  Gabriel Imperato, An Overview of Pervasive Allegations in Hospice and Home Health Fraud 
Cases, 30 HEALTH LAW. 22, 23 (2018).  
 155.  Note that in March 2020, AseraCare settled with the DOJ for $1 million. Scott R. Grubman, 
Hospice Providers Remain Squarely in the Government’s Enforcement Crosshairs, 32 HEALTH LAW 25 
(August 2020). 
 156.  For examples of settlements please see e.g. James F. Barger, Jr., Life, Death, and Medicare 
Fraud: The Corruption of Hospice and What the Private Public Partnership under the Federal False 
Claims Act is Doing About It, 53 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, Appendix (Winter 2016) (finding in 2012, Odyssey 
Healthcare, Inc. settled for $25 million; in 2012 Harmony Care Hospice, Inc. settled for $1.29 million; in 
2013, Hospice of the Comforter, Inc. settled for $3 million; in 2014, Serenity Hospice Care, LLC settled 
for $581,504.46; in 2014, San Diego Hospice & Palliative Care Corp. settled for $1 million out of 
bankruptcy proceeding; in 2015, Good Shepherd Hospice of Mid America settled for $4 million; in 2015, 
Compassionate Care Hospice, Inc. settled for $6.672 million); See also Jacobowski, supra note 132, at 
205-06 (finding in 2009, SouthernCare settled for $24.7 million and in 2006 Odyssey HealthCare, Inc. 
settled for $12.9 million).  
 157.  The exception here might be that no reasonable physician would have concluded the patient 
was terminally ill. However, there is a lesser need for proof of objective falsehood because lawsuits can 
only be brought when patients have outlived their 180-day prognosis. As Jacobowski wrote, in 2008, the 
average length of stay was 69 days. See Jacobowski, supra note 132. By comparison, from 2014-2018, 
the average length of stay rose from 88.2 days to 89.6 days, yet in 2018, only 14.1% of the 1.55 million 
MHB patients needed hospice care for more than 180 days. See NHPCO, Facts and Figures, supra note 
5, at Table 1 and Figure 12, p. 12. Given the percentage of individuals receiving care past 180 days 
combined with the increased statutory requirements, the medical records and brief narratives supporting 
recertification should objectively show if the initial certification and subsequent recertification were 
reasonable and necessary.  
 158.  Compare to text accompanying supra note 91. 
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Circuit should have analyzed the certifications against the reasonable and 
necessary aspects of the MHB. The court should have considered that if a 
fifth recertification yields support that the initial certification was 
unreasonable and unnecessary, the initial certification was false. 
Additionally, the 2011 changes were adopted to reduce the financial 
incentive for providers to certify patients ineligible for hospice 
certification. Those changes may be a direct result of why the government 
would ever intervene. Regardless, the Eleventh Circuit’s holding shields 
hospice providers from future FCA litigation, decreases the government’s 
changes of settling or winning at trial, and may even be a moot legal 
standard.   
V. CONCLUSION 
Adjudication of hospice fraud under the FCA is still a developing body 
of law. Only two circuits have decided the legal standard to resolve 
motions for summary judgment in such cases, which have produced 
divergent analyses and conflicting legal standards. Although the Third 
Circuit holds that physicians’ clinical judgments are not immune from 
judicial scrutiny, the court did not consider how providers legally falsified 
the hospice certifications but instead ruled that a difference in medical 
expert testimony creates a triable issue. Conversely, the Eleventh Circuit 
held that a mere difference of opinions is not evidence of “objective 
falsehood,” and without more, does not create an issue of material fact to 
survive a motion for summary judgment. The Eleventh Circuit’s holding 
protects the subjective nature of a physicians’ clinical judgments and 
grants physicians deference when they certify a patient. The court 
emphasized that estimating death is not an exact science, and thus it is 
inappropriate to require jurors to consider differing  expert opinions.   
Additionally, proof of objective falsehood acknowledges Congress’s 
authority to require more or less requirements for hospice certification. 
Congress exercised that authority when in enacted changes in 2011. Now, 
for the third and all subsequent recertification periods, providers must 
have face-to-face encounters with patients and provide a brief write-up 
for why certification is still proper. The 2011 changes will likely modify 
FCA claims in the future. If providers fail to comply with regulations, 
their failure can yield proof of an objective falsehood when analyzed 
against the reasonable and necessary provision. More powerfully, if there 
is lacking documentation in the medical records, then all subsequent 
certifications would be false because the physician would have certified 
a patient without clinical information and other documentation that 
supports a prognosis of terminal illness. Nonetheless, the Eleventh 
Circuit’s holding effectively grants some immunity to hospice providers 
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against FCA liability and has the potential to greatly reduce the 
government’s ability to collect damages for fraudulent claims. The author 
believes the future of FCA liability will likely be governed by the 
Eleventh Circuit’s holding, and how courts apply that legal standard to 
the 2011 changes will present several other issues for determining hospice 
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